On May 17, 9:53*pm, wrote:

BP has a problem with safety and this is not the first
instance where they crossed the line,

OK - name "they" - the specific people who you claim "crossed the line," and
give the instance in which they did so.


You just keep digging the hole deeper and deeper. I guess you were too
busy to notice that BP was party to ..." the worst industrial accident
in the United States for more than a decade" way before (2005) the
current BP debacle.

You probably do have some acquaintance with Gulf region oil folk. But
apparently your memory doesn't include the explosion at the Texas City
BP refinery, the leaky BP Alaska pipelines, and the aftermath
including the findings of the inquiry panel led by James Baker
regarding the corporate culture of unsafe practices and their
miserable safety record. Maybe those co-eds you claim to have been
boffing should have taught you to do the required reading Before you
put your hand up in class. Here is one short rundown on the James
Baker panel per BP.

"British Petroleum (BP) fired its chief executive, Lord Browne of
Madingley, on Jan 13 this year. Three days later, former United States
secretary of state James Baker released a report on BP’s safety record
and at least one of the reasons for Lord Browne’s involuntary
departure from the company was clear. It concluded that BP had a
"corporate blind spot" when it came to safety. For once, an accident
inquiry looked beyond human error at the operational level and
targeted executive decision making.

The inquiry panel led by the former secretary Baker can anticipate
applause from the ergonomics community. Human factors experts regard
scrutiny of the corporate culture and system as a whole as an
essential part of an accident inquiry, yet investigators often don’t
look higher for mistakes than individual operators.

According to The Washington Post on Jan 13, the debacles that
tarnished the peer’s reputation included a refinery explosion in
Texas, leaky Alaska pipelines that shut down the biggest US oil field,
costly delays in a big Gulf of Mexico production platform and a
handful of dubious business practices.

The Texas fatalities occurred on 23 March, 2005, after gas vapors
ignited at BP’s southernmost US refinery and caused an explosion that
ripped through employee accommodation on the site. Fifteen people died
and more than 170 were injured, making it the worst industrial
accident in the United States for more than a decade.

Some blame Browne for trying to trim costs in assets acquired with the
mergers. The Alaska pipelines hadn’t been cleaned for 14 years, and
the Texas City refinery, inherited from Amoco, had a patchy safety
record.

Former secretary Baker and members of the panel of investigators
interviewed more than 700 BP employees, from hourly refinery workers
right up to Lord Browne, and conducted public meetings in the
communities where the company is a big employer.

Their 350-page analysis, “The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Safety
Panel Review,” detailed safety failings at the company's five US
refineries, from employees too scared to report accidents to an
executive class that failed to implement vital safety procedures. The
theme of the report is that while BP concentrated on reducing personal
injuries at its facilities, it neglected measures designed to enhance
the operational safety of the plants themselves. Executives failed to
instill culture where this "process safety" was paramount, it said.

The report noted that employees were often poorly trained in the
safety procedures required to prevent major incidents, while managers
were sometimes too focused on increasing production to meet profits
expectations.

Budget cutting was also an issue. "If a refinery is under-resourced,
maintenance may be deferred, inspections and testing may fall behind,
old and obsolete equipment may not be replaced, and process risks will
inevitably increase," the report said. "The Panel does not believe
that BP has always ensured that the resources required for strong
process safety performance at its U.S. refineries were identified and
provided."

The company’s US $22 billion in profits in 2006 buttresses the company
against significant pain from government fines and lawsuits won by the
families of employees killed in the refinery explosion and the injured
survivors. The question is whether the company sees any incentive to
make the changes recommended by the Baker panel. "

Apparently BP continued on its merry, sloppy and unsafe way.

Dave