On Mon, 17 May 2010 22:33:18 -0700 (PDT), DaveS wrote:

On May 17, 9:53*pm, wrote:

BP has a problem with safety and this is not the first
instance where they crossed the line,

OK - name "they" - the specific people who you claim "crossed the line," and
give the instance in which they did so.


You just keep digging the hole deeper and deeper. I guess you were too
busy to notice that BP was party to ..." the worst industrial accident
in the United States for more than a decade" way before (2005) the
current BP debacle.

You probably do have some acquaintance with Gulf region oil folk. But
apparently your memory doesn't include the explosion at the Texas City
BP refinery, the leaky BP Alaska pipelines, and the aftermath
including the findings of the inquiry panel led by James Baker
regarding the corporate culture of unsafe practices and their
miserable safety record. Maybe those co-eds you claim to have been
boffing should have taught you to do the required reading Before you
put your hand up in class. Here is one short rundown on the James
Baker panel per BP.

"British Petroleum (BP) fired its chief executive, Lord Browne of
Madingley, on Jan 13 this year.

Huh?

Three days later, former United States
secretary of state James Baker released a report on BP’s safety record
and at least one of the reasons for Lord Browne’s involuntary
departure from the company was clear. It concluded that BP had a
"corporate blind spot" when it came to safety. For once, an accident
inquiry looked beyond human error at the operational level and
targeted executive decision making.

The inquiry panel led by the former secretary Baker can anticipate
applause from the ergonomics community. Human factors experts regard
scrutiny of the corporate culture and system as a whole as an
essential part of an accident inquiry, yet investigators often don’t
look higher for mistakes than individual operators.

According to The Washington Post on Jan 13, the debacles that
tarnished the peer’s reputation included a refinery explosion in
Texas, leaky Alaska pipelines that shut down the biggest US oil field,
costly delays in a big Gulf of Mexico production platform and a
handful of dubious business practices.

The Texas fatalities occurred on 23 March, 2005, after gas vapors
ignited at BP’s southernmost US refinery and caused an explosion that
ripped through employee accommodation on the site. Fifteen people died
and more than 170 were injured, making it the worst industrial
accident in the United States for more than a decade.

Some blame Browne for trying to trim costs in assets acquired with the
mergers. The Alaska pipelines hadn’t been cleaned for 14 years, and
the Texas City refinery, inherited from Amoco, had a patchy safety
record.

Former secretary Baker and members of the panel of investigators
interviewed more than 700 BP employees, from hourly refinery workers
right up to Lord Browne, and conducted public meetings in the
communities where the company is a big employer.

Their 350-page analysis, “The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Safety
Panel Review,” detailed safety failings at the company's five US
refineries, from employees too scared to report accidents to an
executive class that failed to implement vital safety procedures. The
theme of the report is that while BP concentrated on reducing personal
injuries at its facilities, it neglected measures designed to enhance
the operational safety of the plants themselves. Executives failed to
instill culture where this "process safety" was paramount, it said.

The report noted that employees were often poorly trained in the
safety procedures required to prevent major incidents, while managers
were sometimes too focused on increasing production to meet profits
expectations.

Budget cutting was also an issue. "If a refinery is under-resourced,
maintenance may be deferred, inspections and testing may fall behind,
old and obsolete equipment may not be replaced, and process risks will
inevitably increase," the report said. "The Panel does not believe
that BP has always ensured that the resources required for strong
process safety performance at its U.S. refineries were identified and
provided."

The company’s US $22 billion in profits in 2006 buttresses the company
against significant pain from government fines and lawsuits won by the
families of employees killed in the refinery explosion and the injured
survivors. The question is whether the company sees any incentive to
make the changes recommended by the Baker panel. "

Apparently BP continued on its merry, sloppy and unsafe way.

And how do you propose that the former head of the company, who left the company
three years ago (not five as your CnP seems to indicate) is personally
responsible for something that happened 3 years after his leaving, as a result
of something about which, more than likely, no current member of "board-level"
or "chief-level" management was consulted? And FWIW, his resignation merely
came earlier than he had already announced it would due to age over a mostly
made-up "sex scandal" that would have probably not been an issue except for his
being gay.

IAC, can the "oil" industry be a dangerous occupation? Absolutely. Do
companies attempt to reduce costs? Of course they do, and in all industries,
just as prudent individuals do, both in their "business" lives and their
"personal" lives. Sometimes that attempt leads to problems, but most times, it
remains in the realm of merely "prudent business." Also, keep in mind that the
"boom and bust" cycles as well as the commoditization of "oil" has caused quite
a bit of instability in industry that is the nearly-sole source of products that
the large majority of the citizens of the world _DEMAND_. I realize and accept
that a "corporate culture" can and often does "start from the top." OTOH, most
of the decisions that can lead to something like this spill come from the bottom
up, esp. in the oil industry. In fact, there are a number of individually
wealthy people who now own (small in the scheme of things) companies and who
started out as pumpers or other "low-level" workers who built their (small)
fortunes on that very aspect of the industry.

While I don't know for certain in this specific case, I'd say it was entirely
possible that none of the "practical" decisions that led to this spill were made
any higher than an engineer or superintendent-level position. And based upon
personal knowledge in observing those in such positions that I know, I'd say the
chances are that those involved made what they believed to be the best
all-around decision. I don't like the whole culture of "let's blame someone,
or better yet, a corp. and make 'em pay!!!!" nor do I believe that "companies"
or "industries" are "evil." I do understand and accept that the upper
management can be greedy, incompetent, etc., but the day-to-day operation of
individual projects simply isn't dealt with by greedy, incompetent upper
management.

And I'm about finished with this - either put up or shut up -

Again, please name the specific people who you charge are responsible for this
spill and give the facts you allege go to prove, even if only by preponderance
of the evidence rather than that beyond a reasonable doubt, that responsibility.

TC,
R


Dave