Whisky/Whiskey trivia question

On Sun, 16 May 2010 23:18:34 -0700 (PDT), --riverman wrote:

On May 17, 1:27*pm, John B wrote:
On May 12, 5:42*am, riverman wrote:

Without googling the answer, what whisk(e)y (name deliberately
universalized) was the only brand legally sold during Prohibition in
the US? *For extra credit; by whom and why?

--riverman

That would be Jim Beam....for medicinal purposes only...

If I am not mistaken,,,during prohibition...there was an allowance per
week...

My friend...how is it that we share the same radio stations....see you
soon...

John

Actually...the IMPORTED whisky I was referring to (and possibly
erroneously) is Laphroaig.
http://www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/home/jhb/whisky/smws/29.html

Y'all may want to check up on that. I've seen "prescription bottles" (or
perhaps more correctly, bottles with the "prescription form" on them) from other
than Beam and Laphroaig.

TC,
R

On Thu, 13 May 2010 03:48:25 -0700 (PDT), DaveS wrote:

"We shall see" is the real answer to most all right now.

Um, that's what I said about a day ot two after this happened...

Dave
Think ity, bity, teeny, tiny creatures. Think way smaller than 22s or
the rumored 28s. Think itzy bitzy. Then think soap and worse.

Ooooh...I thought he was talking about CARTOON plankters...

And IAC, it's not soap, it's Corexit, IIRC, 9500A. It's not what was used with
Ixtoc (a different Corexit/Nalco/Exxon product, 9527, from the same family) but
this is less toxic on its own and in use - unfortunately, there is no way to
truly test this kind of thing, so "less toxic" can only mean so much until
"real-world" results are seen. From what I understand, lab results are at least
promising insofar as "less toxic" goes. Research after Ixtoc was scant and
somewhat scattered (there is a report out there - check the Oxford Journals if
you can/wish), and while the effects of the 9527 weren't "none," they weren't as
bad as one might guess, either. So hopefully with the 9500, things won't be too
bad. At the end of the day, it will remain a "we'll see..."

HTH,
R

On 2010-05-17 17:28:08 -0400, said:

So hopefully with the 9500, things won't be too
bad. At the end of the day, it will remain a "we'll see..."

Yeah, and, I mean, nuclear weapons weren't all *that* bad, were they?

You are becoming more of an idiot every day, Richard.

Davey (and don't call me after 10 pm MY TIME)

On May 17, 4:28*pm, wrote:
On Thu, 13 May 2010 03:48:25 -0700 (PDT), DaveS wrote:
"We shall see" is the real answer to most all right now.

Um, that's what I said about a day ot two after this happened...

Dave
Think ity, bity, teeny, tiny creatures. Think way smaller than 22s or
the rumored 28s. Think itzy bitzy. Then think soap and worse.

Ooooh...I thought he was talking about CARTOON plankters...

And IAC, it's not soap, it's Corexit, IIRC, 9500A. *It's not what was used with
Ixtoc (a different Corexit/Nalco/Exxon product, 9527, from the same family) but
this is less toxic on its own and in use - unfortunately, there is no way to
truly test this kind of thing, so "less toxic" can only mean so much until
"real-world" results are seen. *From what I understand, lab results are at least
promising insofar as "less toxic" goes. *Research after Ixtoc was scant and
somewhat scattered (there is a report out there - check the Oxford Journals if
you can/wish), and while the effects of the 9527 weren't "none," they weren't as
bad as one might guess, either. *So hopefully with the 9500, things won't be too
bad. *At the end of the day, it will remain a "we'll see..."

HTH,
R



g.

On May 17, 8:39*pm, David LaCourse wrote:
On 2010-05-17 17:28:08 -0400, said:

So hopefully with the 9500, things won't be too
bad. *At the end of the day, it will remain a "we'll see..."

Yeah, and, I mean, nuclear weapons weren't all *that* bad, were they?

You are becoming more of an idiot every day, Richard.

Davey (and don't call me after 10 pm MY TIME)



g.

On Mon, 17 May 2010 21:39:36 -0400, David LaCourse wrote:

On 2010-05-17 17:28:08 -0400, said:

So hopefully with the 9500, things won't be too
bad. At the end of the day, it will remain a "we'll see..."

Yeah, and, I mean, nuclear weapons weren't all *that* bad, were they?

I guess it depends if you are sender or the recipient...but hey, super premium
and the material to make Simms GWhiz waders and Depends gotta come from
somewhere, donchaknow...

You are becoming more of an idiot every day, Richard.

Aw, have you been nuzzling up with goatboys again...?

Davey (and don't call me after 10 pm MY TIME)

Um, well, I wouldn't hold your breath about before 10 pm YOUR TIME...or
Zulu...or GMT...or even by the Aztec calendar...

HTH,
R

On May 17, 2:28*pm, wrote:
On Thu, 13 May 2010 03:48:25 -0700 (PDT), DaveS wrote:
"We shall see" is the real answer to most all right now.

Um, that's what I said about a day ot two after this happened...

Dave
Think ity, bity, teeny, tiny creatures. Think way smaller than 22s or
the rumored 28s. Think itzy bitzy. Then think soap and worse.

Ooooh...I thought he was talking about CARTOON plankters...

And IAC, it's not soap, it's Corexit, IIRC, 9500A. *It's not what was used with
Ixtoc (a different Corexit/Nalco/Exxon product, 9527, from the same family) but
this is less toxic on its own and in use - unfortunately, there is no way to
truly test this kind of thing, so "less toxic" can only mean so much until
"real-world" results are seen. *From what I understand, lab results are at least
promising insofar as "less toxic" goes. *Research after Ixtoc was scant and
somewhat scattered (there is a report out there - check the Oxford Journals if
you can/wish), and while the effects of the 9527 weren't "none," they weren't as
bad as one might guess, either. *So hopefully with the 9500, things won't be too
bad. *At the end of the day, it will remain a "we'll see..."

HTH,
R

Richard,
We have an expression in the West that points out the inadvisability
of ****ing into the wind. Before you dig this hole deeper be sure you
understand just what a detergent is and what it takes to make a
hydrocarbon water miscible.

I personally am limited in this matter by my night school HS chem, and
the four semesters of bonehead sciences we were required to take at
BYU. To make matters worse we were required to attend classes, stay
awake and do our own labs, definitly a curse that forever after
inoculated me with skepticism towards folk like oil industry PR people
with a fondness for 9000 series numbers and gucci shoes. In the words
of one of my old economics mentors, Dr Sar Levitan (GWU) "there is no
free lunch."

These people (BP etc) apparently were not following industry best
practices. BP has a problem with safety and this is not the first
instance where they crossed the line, You do not need to defend them.
We all use and rely on petro products. If some assholes cut corners we
need to fix the problem. Not paper it over or pretend.

Dave

On Mon, 17 May 2010 20:52:02 -0700 (PDT), DaveS wrote:

On May 17, 2:28*pm, wrote:
On Thu, 13 May 2010 03:48:25 -0700 (PDT), DaveS wrote:
"We shall see" is the real answer to most all right now.

Um, that's what I said about a day ot two after this happened...

Dave
Think ity, bity, teeny, tiny creatures. Think way smaller than 22s or
the rumored 28s. Think itzy bitzy. Then think soap and worse.

Ooooh...I thought he was talking about CARTOON plankters...

And IAC, it's not soap, it's Corexit, IIRC, 9500A. *It's not what was used with
Ixtoc (a different Corexit/Nalco/Exxon product, 9527, from the same family) but
this is less toxic on its own and in use - unfortunately, there is no way to
truly test this kind of thing, so "less toxic" can only mean so much until
"real-world" results are seen. *From what I understand, lab results are at least
promising insofar as "less toxic" goes. *Research after Ixtoc was scant and
somewhat scattered (there is a report out there - check the Oxford Journals if
you can/wish), and while the effects of the 9527 weren't "none," they weren't as
bad as one might guess, either. *So hopefully with the 9500, things won't be too
bad. *At the end of the day, it will remain a "we'll see..."

HTH,
R

Richard,
We have an expression in the West that points out the inadvisability
of ****ing into the wind. Before you dig this hole deeper be sure you
understand just what a detergent is and what it takes to make a
hydrocarbon water miscible.

I personally am limited in this matter by my night school HS chem, and
the four semesters of bonehead sciences we were required to take at
BYU. To make matters worse we were required to attend classes, stay
awake and do our own labs, definitly a curse that forever after
inoculated me with skepticism towards folk like oil industry PR people
with a fondness for 9000 series numbers and gucci shoes.

Well, I knew that BYU was pretty weird, but I had no idea that they had oil
industry PR people in Gucci shoes attempting to teach you boneheads
science...maybe that is why you didn't learn anything useful there...IAC, I had
pledges and sorority girls do all my work. Why shoot, I wound up with a couple
of degrees from schools I didn't even attend simply by virtue of having given a
few of the local Chi-Os the high hard one...

In the words
of one of my old economics mentors, Dr Sar Levitan (GWU) "there is no
free lunch."

Well, no one knows exactly what the outcome of this will be, but if anyone would
be in a position to make predictions about the possible ramifications of an oil
spill and the chemicals used in attempting to mitigate it, one of your old econ
mentors would sure be the person to whom you should look...

These people (BP etc) apparently were not following industry best
practices.

Um, "industry best?" Maybe Dr. Sar can explain what the "industry best" was in
this situation...FWIW, "the Obama administration" held this well up as an
example of how it ought to be done...and also FWIW, IMO, neither your appraisal
of "industry best" or the accolade is worth jack ****...there is no "industry
best" in something like this - there is only "we hope like a mother****er that
this works like we think it will," with the "we" being basically mid-level
engineers, operations people, etc. doing the best they know how to do on a
project that doesn't have a lot of "industry standard" information to which they
can refer.

BP has a problem with safety and this is not the first
instance where they crossed the line,

OK - name "they" - the specific people who you claim "crossed the line," and
give the instance in which they did so.

You do not need to defend them.

I'm not defending anyone because I don't know who to defend (or blame) and
neither do you. But from my personal experience with petroleum exploration
projects and from what I've seen and heard from people at all levels of the
industry (prior to this incident), with a project such as this, much of it is,
well, see about "we hope like a mother****er..."

We all use and rely on petro products. If some assholes cut corners we
need to fix the problem. Not paper it over or pretend.

Dave, I'm down here, not you. I've seen a virtual army of people on the beaches
in Tyveks, searching for a tarball the size of cat turd (they found 13 on MS
beaches this weekend), the 2-3 lawyer commercials every commercial break, and
the general ramping-up of the (thus far) ****storm-in-a-teacup. And I saw the
total, complete and utter bull**** in the aftermath of Katrina. But I'm also
aware of the _many_ rigs and wells in the gulf and the overall "spill per barrel
produced" ratio, producing a product that those in the US _demand_. And until
it is _clear_ what the damage is, I'm totally opposed to busting anyone's chops
over this. If and when BP is shown to be negligent in this, I'm all for busting
not only their chops but their ass in a manner appropriate to that negligence.

And FWIW, I know a fair number of people in "oil business," from roughnecks to
company owners and I cannot think of anyone with a vested interest in the
successful completion (IOW, the well producing) of a well "cutting corners" on
the pressure control side of things, assuming "cutting corners" is used in the
ordinary sense.

HTH,
R
Dave

On May 17, 9:53*pm, wrote:

BP has a problem with safety and this is not the first
instance where they crossed the line,

OK - name "they" - the specific people who you claim "crossed the line," and
give the instance in which they did so.


You just keep digging the hole deeper and deeper. I guess you were too
busy to notice that BP was party to ..." the worst industrial accident
in the United States for more than a decade" way before (2005) the
current BP debacle.

You probably do have some acquaintance with Gulf region oil folk. But
apparently your memory doesn't include the explosion at the Texas City
BP refinery, the leaky BP Alaska pipelines, and the aftermath
including the findings of the inquiry panel led by James Baker
regarding the corporate culture of unsafe practices and their
miserable safety record. Maybe those co-eds you claim to have been
boffing should have taught you to do the required reading Before you
put your hand up in class. Here is one short rundown on the James
Baker panel per BP.

"British Petroleum (BP) fired its chief executive, Lord Browne of
Madingley, on Jan 13 this year. Three days later, former United States
secretary of state James Baker released a report on BP’s safety record
and at least one of the reasons for Lord Browne’s involuntary
departure from the company was clear. It concluded that BP had a
"corporate blind spot" when it came to safety. For once, an accident
inquiry looked beyond human error at the operational level and
targeted executive decision making.

The inquiry panel led by the former secretary Baker can anticipate
applause from the ergonomics community. Human factors experts regard
scrutiny of the corporate culture and system as a whole as an
essential part of an accident inquiry, yet investigators often don’t
look higher for mistakes than individual operators.

According to The Washington Post on Jan 13, the debacles that
tarnished the peer’s reputation included a refinery explosion in
Texas, leaky Alaska pipelines that shut down the biggest US oil field,
costly delays in a big Gulf of Mexico production platform and a
handful of dubious business practices.

The Texas fatalities occurred on 23 March, 2005, after gas vapors
ignited at BP’s southernmost US refinery and caused an explosion that
ripped through employee accommodation on the site. Fifteen people died
and more than 170 were injured, making it the worst industrial
accident in the United States for more than a decade.

Some blame Browne for trying to trim costs in assets acquired with the
mergers. The Alaska pipelines hadn’t been cleaned for 14 years, and
the Texas City refinery, inherited from Amoco, had a patchy safety
record.

Former secretary Baker and members of the panel of investigators
interviewed more than 700 BP employees, from hourly refinery workers
right up to Lord Browne, and conducted public meetings in the
communities where the company is a big employer.

Their 350-page analysis, “The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Safety
Panel Review,” detailed safety failings at the company's five US
refineries, from employees too scared to report accidents to an
executive class that failed to implement vital safety procedures. The
theme of the report is that while BP concentrated on reducing personal
injuries at its facilities, it neglected measures designed to enhance
the operational safety of the plants themselves. Executives failed to
instill culture where this "process safety" was paramount, it said.

The report noted that employees were often poorly trained in the
safety procedures required to prevent major incidents, while managers
were sometimes too focused on increasing production to meet profits
expectations.

Budget cutting was also an issue. "If a refinery is under-resourced,
maintenance may be deferred, inspections and testing may fall behind,
old and obsolete equipment may not be replaced, and process risks will
inevitably increase," the report said. "The Panel does not believe
that BP has always ensured that the resources required for strong
process safety performance at its U.S. refineries were identified and
provided."

The company’s US $22 billion in profits in 2006 buttresses the company
against significant pain from government fines and lawsuits won by the
families of employees killed in the refinery explosion and the injured
survivors. The question is whether the company sees any incentive to
make the changes recommended by the Baker panel. "

Apparently BP continued on its merry, sloppy and unsafe way.

Dave

On Mon, 17 May 2010 22:33:18 -0700 (PDT), DaveS wrote:

On May 17, 9:53*pm, wrote:

BP has a problem with safety and this is not the first
instance where they crossed the line,

OK - name "they" - the specific people who you claim "crossed the line," and
give the instance in which they did so.


You just keep digging the hole deeper and deeper. I guess you were too
busy to notice that BP was party to ..." the worst industrial accident
in the United States for more than a decade" way before (2005) the
current BP debacle.

You probably do have some acquaintance with Gulf region oil folk. But
apparently your memory doesn't include the explosion at the Texas City
BP refinery, the leaky BP Alaska pipelines, and the aftermath
including the findings of the inquiry panel led by James Baker
regarding the corporate culture of unsafe practices and their
miserable safety record. Maybe those co-eds you claim to have been
boffing should have taught you to do the required reading Before you
put your hand up in class. Here is one short rundown on the James
Baker panel per BP.

"British Petroleum (BP) fired its chief executive, Lord Browne of
Madingley, on Jan 13 this year.

Huh?

Three days later, former United States
secretary of state James Baker released a report on BP’s safety record
and at least one of the reasons for Lord Browne’s involuntary
departure from the company was clear. It concluded that BP had a
"corporate blind spot" when it came to safety. For once, an accident
inquiry looked beyond human error at the operational level and
targeted executive decision making.

The inquiry panel led by the former secretary Baker can anticipate
applause from the ergonomics community. Human factors experts regard
scrutiny of the corporate culture and system as a whole as an
essential part of an accident inquiry, yet investigators often don’t
look higher for mistakes than individual operators.

According to The Washington Post on Jan 13, the debacles that
tarnished the peer’s reputation included a refinery explosion in
Texas, leaky Alaska pipelines that shut down the biggest US oil field,
costly delays in a big Gulf of Mexico production platform and a
handful of dubious business practices.

The Texas fatalities occurred on 23 March, 2005, after gas vapors
ignited at BP’s southernmost US refinery and caused an explosion that
ripped through employee accommodation on the site. Fifteen people died
and more than 170 were injured, making it the worst industrial
accident in the United States for more than a decade.

Some blame Browne for trying to trim costs in assets acquired with the
mergers. The Alaska pipelines hadn’t been cleaned for 14 years, and
the Texas City refinery, inherited from Amoco, had a patchy safety
record.

Former secretary Baker and members of the panel of investigators
interviewed more than 700 BP employees, from hourly refinery workers
right up to Lord Browne, and conducted public meetings in the
communities where the company is a big employer.

Their 350-page analysis, “The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Safety
Panel Review,” detailed safety failings at the company's five US
refineries, from employees too scared to report accidents to an
executive class that failed to implement vital safety procedures. The
theme of the report is that while BP concentrated on reducing personal
injuries at its facilities, it neglected measures designed to enhance
the operational safety of the plants themselves. Executives failed to
instill culture where this "process safety" was paramount, it said.

The report noted that employees were often poorly trained in the
safety procedures required to prevent major incidents, while managers
were sometimes too focused on increasing production to meet profits
expectations.

Budget cutting was also an issue. "If a refinery is under-resourced,
maintenance may be deferred, inspections and testing may fall behind,
old and obsolete equipment may not be replaced, and process risks will
inevitably increase," the report said. "The Panel does not believe
that BP has always ensured that the resources required for strong
process safety performance at its U.S. refineries were identified and
provided."

The company’s US $22 billion in profits in 2006 buttresses the company
against significant pain from government fines and lawsuits won by the
families of employees killed in the refinery explosion and the injured
survivors. The question is whether the company sees any incentive to
make the changes recommended by the Baker panel. "

Apparently BP continued on its merry, sloppy and unsafe way.

And how do you propose that the former head of the company, who left the company
three years ago (not five as your CnP seems to indicate) is personally
responsible for something that happened 3 years after his leaving, as a result
of something about which, more than likely, no current member of "board-level"
or "chief-level" management was consulted? And FWIW, his resignation merely
came earlier than he had already announced it would due to age over a mostly
made-up "sex scandal" that would have probably not been an issue except for his
being gay.

IAC, can the "oil" industry be a dangerous occupation? Absolutely. Do
companies attempt to reduce costs? Of course they do, and in all industries,
just as prudent individuals do, both in their "business" lives and their
"personal" lives. Sometimes that attempt leads to problems, but most times, it
remains in the realm of merely "prudent business." Also, keep in mind that the
"boom and bust" cycles as well as the commoditization of "oil" has caused quite
a bit of instability in industry that is the nearly-sole source of products that
the large majority of the citizens of the world _DEMAND_. I realize and accept
that a "corporate culture" can and often does "start from the top." OTOH, most
of the decisions that can lead to something like this spill come from the bottom
up, esp. in the oil industry. In fact, there are a number of individually
wealthy people who now own (small in the scheme of things) companies and who
started out as pumpers or other "low-level" workers who built their (small)
fortunes on that very aspect of the industry.

While I don't know for certain in this specific case, I'd say it was entirely
possible that none of the "practical" decisions that led to this spill were made
any higher than an engineer or superintendent-level position. And based upon
personal knowledge in observing those in such positions that I know, I'd say the
chances are that those involved made what they believed to be the best
all-around decision. I don't like the whole culture of "let's blame someone,
or better yet, a corp. and make 'em pay!!!!" nor do I believe that "companies"
or "industries" are "evil." I do understand and accept that the upper
management can be greedy, incompetent, etc., but the day-to-day operation of
individual projects simply isn't dealt with by greedy, incompetent upper
management.

And I'm about finished with this - either put up or shut up -

Again, please name the specific people who you charge are responsible for this
spill and give the facts you allege go to prove, even if only by preponderance
of the evidence rather than that beyond a reasonable doubt, that responsibility.

TC,
R


Dave